Battle of the Bulge

  By S. Craig Taylor, Jr.

PRELUDE TO BATTLE

The Battle of the Bulge is a compiled reprint from 2006's issues of Cher Ami. Enjoy!

The Battle of the Bulge is of interest to Lost Battalion Games because it touches on two of the games in our line. Our COMBAT SOLDIERS In the Battle of the Bulge card game is an abstract recreation of the battle at a low level that catches the confusion of the actions. If you own the SERGEANTS! – Expansion, you now have American units and some Battle of the Bulge scenarios, already finished and play tested, will be available soon. During World War Two, the two most serious "surprises" experienced by the United States were the "Day of Infamy", the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the German Ardennes offensive known as the "Battle of the Bulge", starting on December 16, 1944. In both instances, clues of unusual activity were misunderstood and disregarded.

The Japanese thought they could strike hard blows and win enough early victories to force a victorious negotiated settlement – that plan had worked for them before in the 1904 – 1905 Russo-Japanese War. The United States was surprised that the Japanese would start a war with such a powerful adversary that they would inevitably lose and also surprised at the location of the attack – if the Japanese attacked, it was expected to be directed at the British in Malaya and at the United States in the Philippines. The Japanese thought that eliminating the United States Pacific Fleet with a surprise followed up by quick conquests in the Pacific was a way to win an otherwise uneven war. The Japanese were later surprised themselves when they found that the United States was prepared to accept the heavy losses necessary to roll back the Japanese defense perimeter.

In the 1944 German surprise, after a series of catastrophic disasters in 1944, the Germans were thought to be finished. The German high command, at least in the person of Nazi dictator Adolf Hitler, thought that a surprise offensive in the Ardennes would reverse the war’s momentum – an offensive through the Ardennes had worked before, in 1940, when France was overrun and forced to surrender. Of course, Hitler ignored most basic military logic in his desperate, last-ditch effort to change the course of the war. Ever since, commentators have sought to show how various "clues" were available to predict both attacks but the real, root cause for the surprises at Pearl Harbor and in the Ardennes was an inability to understand the enemy’s desperate and twisted logic.

Militarily, "surprise" is considered to be a "force multiplier". A force having the advantage of surprise is more effective in combat. A force that has been surprised is confused, disorganized and demoralized and is less effective in combat. The combination of a more effective attacker and a less effective defender multiplies the value of the attacker beyond normal comparisons of numbers, equipment and training.

By the end of 1944, the war was going very much against Nazi Germany. In the east, "Operation Bagration", starting on June 22, turned into the "Destruction of Army Group Center" as a huge hole was ripped in the German lines. The Soviet armies drove on to the borders of East Prussia and 25 German divisions simply disappeared. Earlier that month, the Allied armies in Italy broke through the German mountain defenses, liberated Rome on June 4 and drove into northern Italy. Two days after the fall of Rome, the Allied armies in Great Britain, under Dwight D. "Ike" Eisenhower, established a beachhead in Normandy on "D-Day", June 6, 1944. This tied up the 1,000,000 German troops in northern Europe in a bloody campaign of attrition as the Allied beachhead was expanded and heavily reinforced. Two months later, the Allies broke out at Avaranches in "Operation Cobra", leading to a German rout and their near encirclement near Falaise. Most of France and the Low Countries were liberated by the victorious Allied armies as they drove forward to the German border as the colors of autumn deepened.

Allied progress slowed as gasoline, entering the continent over the Normandy beaches, now hundreds of miles to the rear, could not be brought forward fast enough for their hard-charging mechanized spearheads. While the Allies were stalled, the Germans gained time to deploy newly-raised troops to defend their prewar border fortifications, known as the "West Wall" or "Siegfried Line". These fortifications were out of date but strong enough to protect the German defenders from the overwhelmingly powerful Allied artillery and airpower. In addition to supply problems, the 60 American, British, Canadian, French and Polish divisions in northern Europe were suffering a manpower crunch. American and Canadian replacements had to cross the Atlantic, French conscripts needed training, as most of their army from 1940 was still in German prisoner of war camps, the Poles were cut off from their country’s potential recruits and the British, after five years of war, were reaching the end of their manpower pool. Aggravating American replacement problems was that, prior to mid 1944, most U. S. Army losses had been in the Air Force, then part of the Army. The United States, which provided the majority of the Allied divisions, had trained a high a percentage of its manpower for tasks other than ground combat so there was a shortage of ground pounding infantrymen. Even the trained infantrymen still at home were slow to arrive in Europe as the war there was felt to be almost over and there was a reluctance to ship troops to Europe that could be used in the ongoing war in the Pacific.

British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Twenty-First Army Group, made a daring attempt to use paratroopers to seize the key bridges through the Netherlands into Germany in "Operation Market Garden" but the attempt failed. His Canadian First Army was involved in a long and difficult campaign to clear the approaches to the great port of Antwerp. Once Antwerp was available, its use as a port and supply center would relieve Allied supply problems. Until then, General Eisenhower felt he could only bring the Allied armies into a continuous line along the German border, maintaining pressure until the Germans either snapped or the arrival of more gasoline and replacements permitted a resumption of a full-fledged Allied drive into Germany.

As the late autumn Allied campaign developed, American General Omar N. Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group was advancing slowly. The American United States First and Ninth armies inched forward north of the Ardennes. South of the Ardennes, American General George S. "Blood and Guts" Patton’s United States Third Army was also advancing slowly. Between the First and Third armies, Bradley, as a "calculated risk", left only the four divisions of General Troy Middleton’s United States VIII Corps to hold eighty miles of rugged Ardennes terrain. In peacetime the Ardennes is a picturesque vacation area. In 1940, the German panzer (armored) divisions had run right over the handful of unprepared French troops in the area on their way to defeating France in only six weeks. Despite that earlier success, the area was unsuited for large mechanized operations and by late 1944 was a "ghost front" where both sides assigned wrecked units to recuperate from fighting elsewhere.

In a meeting on September 16, 1944, long before the Allied armies had reached the German border, German Fuhrer Adolf Hitler announced his intention to launch an offensive through the Ardennes. Planned for November, the attack was to be made by the three armies of Field Marshal Model’s German Army Group B. Repeated delays in accumulating troops, material and supplies eventually pushed the schedule back to the middle of December. Until then, German General Erich Brandenberger’s Seventh German Army and German General Gunther Blumentritt’s German Fifteenth Army were tasked with holding the line while reserves were massed to the rear.

THE PLAN

Reserves assembled to the rear of the German front lines consisted of the newly-organized German Sixth Panzer Army, under General Josef "Sepp" Dietrich, which included four powerful SS panzer divisions. Its companion German Fifth Panzer Army, under General Hasso von Manteuffel, included four army panzer divisions. As part of the German reorganization in preparation for the attack, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, an old, competent and much respected commander (already relieved of command twice by Hitler) was again appointed to command the Western Front. Early accounts of the Battle of the Bulge often referred to it as the "Rundstedt Offensive" but he was merely a figurehead in the Fuhrer’s lofty schemes. The old Field Marshal was a ploy – his prestige was used to rally other German generals to the plan.

 The German offensive would fall in the thinly-held Ardennes and would use the four armies in Army Group B. Every effort was bent to assemble maximum forces and to achieve surprise. The north flank would be held by the Fifteenth Army, whose infantry was to advance to cover the right flank of the Sixth Panzer Army but, in the event, took only a small part in the offensive. The main German effort was to be made by the Sixth Panzer Army, with the Fifth Panzer Army advancing parallel to it and covering its left flank. The Seventh Army, which originally held most of the front, was to cover the left flank of the Fifth Panzer Army in a more limited infantry advance.

German plans called for the oversized SS panzer divisions of Sixth Panzer Army to reach the Meuse River in 48 hours, establish a bridgehead near Liege and then wheel north to capture Antwerp. In a parallel advance to the south, Fifth Panzer Army was to cross the Meuse River near Namur and then capture Brussels. The attacking divisions got first call on Germany’s decreasing manpower reserves, vehicle production, airpower support and all available ammunition and gasoline. Despite their efforts, the Germans were so short of gasoline that their plans required capturing large stocks of Allied petroleum during the offensive. By single-mindedly concentrating on one object, more strength was concentrated in the Ardennes than the Allies believed possible. Hitler’s plan was intended to totally change the course of the war on the Western Front. Seizing Antwerp would disrupt Allied supply lines and cut off some 37 Allied divisions. If all went well, the planned success would allow resources to be shifted to more neglected fronts once the offensive was over.

Contrary to the Fuhrer’s plans, his generals’ more conventional military minds agreed that his reach exceeded his grasp and they proposed a less ambitious offensive to "spoil" the coming Allied offensive by cutting off and destroying the salient already created by American attacks north of the Ardennes. After barely surviving a coup attempt by the officer corps on July 20, Hitler refused to listen to their "defeatist" ideas and insisted that his plans be implemented. The German forces were massed under an effective cover plan. Although the Germans did not realize it, their use of land lines (the German telephone network) eliminated the super-secret "Ultra" radio interceptions that had served Allied intelligence so well in the past. Radio messages used by the German military were used to simulate defensive preparations. As a further deception, the code name for the offensive was the defensive sounding "Wacht am Rhine" ("Watch on the Rhine"). Troops and vehicles were moved up from their hidden reserve positions only at the last minute. Finally, at 0530 hours on December 16, a brief but violent artillery barrage started falling on the American lines and the offensive began.

THE INITIAL ADVANCES OF SIXTH PANZER ARMY

All along the front, starting in the darkest hours of the night, carefully preregistered German artillery crashed into American defensive positions. After an hour of bombardment, the German tanks and infantrymen swarmed forward as giant searchlights played their beams on low clouds to create "artificial moonlight". Atrocious weather precluded much air activity during the early days of the offensive, so the issue was to be decided by the men on the ground.

 In the far north of the offensive, Sepp Dietrich's Sixth Panzer Army attacked elements of General Leonard Gerow's United States V Corps. Dietrich opted to lead with his infantry to punch a hole in the American lines before committing his armor. Assaults by the German 272nd and 326th Volksgrenadier divisions failed to gain much ground from the U. S. 78th Infantry Division and 102nd Cavalry Group. The main attack caught the veteran United States 2nd Infantry Division passing through the green United States 99th Infantry Division to continue an ongoing American attack. Caught seriously off-balance, the Americans nevertheless skillfully fought off the German 12th Volksgrenadier, the 277th Volksgrenadier and the panzergrenadiers (infantry) of the 12th SS Panzer divisions, delaying them in a series of battles centered on the villages of Rocherath and Krinklet. With German presuure increasing and threatened with encirclement, the two American infantry divisions gradually fell back to the town of Elsenborn and then to nearby Elsenborn Ridge by the 19th. Joined there by the arriving United States 1st and 9th Infantry divisions, the V Corps held off all further German assaults. The skillfull fighting retreat and final solid defense here blocked the German drive on Liege, Belgium, the shortest route to the Meuse River.

South of Elsenborn, Peiper's Panzer Brigade of the 1st SS Panzer Division, with over 100 tanks and self-propelled guns, many of them the huge and dreaded Tigers, slipped through the thin American lines and advanced into the American rear area, followed at a distance by the rest of the 1st SS Panzer Division and, after their relief further north by the 3rd Panzergrenadier Division, by the 12th SS Panzer Division. Oberst (= Colonel) Friedrich Heydte's paratroopers, hopelessly spread out after a night drop on December 16/17, still led to additional confusion in this critical area. The 150th Panzer Brigade was also later fed into this confused fighting.

The 150th Panzer Brigade, although commanded by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer (= Lieutenant Colonel) Otto Skorzeny, was a normal army unit of low strength and combat value. What it did have was English-speaking soldiers, captured American vehicles and German vehicles painted to look like American ones. Although the unit's combat career was short and ineffective, it spread its share of confusion. Jeep loads of English-speaking German soldiers infiltrated the American lines, removing and changing road signs, ambushing convoys and even managed to worry the headquarters guards protecting Eisenhower himself. This relative handful of German operatives caused the Americans to set up hundreds of road blocks where soldiers were forced to prove they were Americans by answering who was the girlfriend of Mickey Mouse and what baseball team featured Joe Dimaggio (who was in the service himself in 1944). When captured, these Germans were shot as spies.

Hitler also called for a "wave of terror" to sow confusion in the Allied ranks. The SS (= "Schutzstaffeln" = "Protection Squads") originally formed a small but politically reliable bodyguard for Hitler but, by 1944, literally constituted an army within an army in the German war machine. Although many of the dozens of SS units were drawn from foreign rabble, nazi sympathizers and turncoats and were of low or indifferent quality, the seven SS Panzer divisions, five of which were on the Western Front, were usually considered to be "elite" units with high morale and the most and best equipment. At age 29, Joachim Peiper was a veteran SS commander with a particularly ruthless reputation from the Soviet Front and the Waffen SS (= "Armed SS") troops in all their panzer and panzergrenadier divisions were especially brutal. The SS advances were leaving trails of executed American prisoners and Belgian civilians in their wake, the most notorious incident veing the infamous "Malmedy Massacre". As word of these atrocities spread, American anger grew and some units vowed to take no prisoners in SS uniforms, which led to some particularly nasty struggles in the weeks to come.

In a classic "blitzkreig" (= "lightning war"), crushing small units and going around larger ones, Peiper's Brigade led the German advance, at one point forcing the evacuation of Hodge's United States First Army headquarters at Spa. Advancing along multiple roads with various spearheads, Peiper's force repeatedly ran afoul of varied resistance from isolated engineer units at roadblocks, blown bridges across unfordable waterways and vicious organized resistance in strong defensive positions held by regular American combat outfits. Making it as far as Stoumont before running out of gasoline, Peiper found himself separated from the other SS units in a position that was nearly surrounded and endlessly blasted by the excellent American artillery. Worse, the SS troops were relentlessly attacked by elements of the United States 3rd Armored, 30th Infantry (also busy hunting down Heydte's paratroopers) and 82nd Airborne divisions. After heavy fighting, the German spearhead was largely destroyed. Peiper and 800 of his men finally escaped only by abandoning all their vehicles and heavy equipment and walking back to the German lines. This all but ended the independent offensive by the German Sixth Panzer Army. By December 21, the original German plan had failed.

THE INITIAL GERMAN ADVANCES IN THE SOUTH

Despite the presence of the powerful SS panzer divisions, the original German plan for their Sixth Panzer Army fell hopelessly behind schedule. The effect of the initial surprise had not prevented numerous American formations from reaching and reinforcing the northern "shoulder" of the developing bulge in the Allied lines. On the other hand, Manteuffel's German Fifth Panzer Army, originally intended to support the Sixth Panzer Army's advance, was unexpectedly successful. Although no German formation came close to reaching the Meuse River in the first 48 hours, the German center gained some significant successes.

In the northern sector of the Fifth Panzer Army's front, the 3rd Fallschirmjager and 18th and 62nd Volksgrenadier divisions, later joined by the Fuhrer Begleit (= Fuhrer Escort) Brigade, pushed aside and virtually destroyed the U. S. 14th Cavalry Group while advancing rapidly towards St. Vith and into the rear of the green U. S. 106th Infantry Division. While elements of the volksgrenadier divisions assaulted the 106th frontally, other Germans moved around its flanks. Two American infantry regiments were surrounded and, unable to retreat, surrendered on December 19.

Further west, the U. S. 7th Armored Division, originally tasked to counterattack and save the 106th Infantry Division, found itself barely able to hang on near St. Vith, which the head of the division reached by nightfall on December 17. Eventually further reinforced by the 112th Infantry Regiment (from the 28th Infantry Division), the 424th Infantry Regiment (the regiment of the 106th Infantry Division that was not encircled) and a combat command from the 9th Armored Division, the Americans held on against increasingly heavy German assaults. German pressure increased until, on December 21, an all-out German assault by the Fuhrer Begleit Brigade, the 2SS Panzer, 9ss Panzer 18th Volksgrenadier and 62nd Volksgrenadier divisions drove the defenders back into a bulged salient west of St. Vith, that came to be called the "Fortified Goose Egg". This position seemed dangerously exposed and, to shorten their lines, the Americans were withdrawn towards the positions of the American 82nd Airborne Division near Vielsalm.

In the southern part of the German Fifth Panzer Army's front, the spread-out units of the veteran U. S. 28th Infantry Division were hit by the 2nd Panzer, 116th Panzer, Lehr Panzer, 26th Volksgrenadier and 560th Volksgrenadier divisions as well as the German Seventh Army's 5th Fallschirmjager and 352nd Volksgranadier divisions. The Americans fought desperately to contest the advance while blowing bridges to further delay the Germans but Clervaux and Wiltz were taken and much of two regiments of the 28th Infantry Division were destroyed as the Germans made their most significant advances of the early days of the offensive. The sacrifices by the 28th Infantry division gave time for additional troops to reach the sector. First on the scene, the U. S. 10th Armored Division organized small task groups to establish road blocks along the main roads leading to the key road hub at Bastogne. These task groups gained enough time to allow the U. S. 101st Airborne Division to be trucked into Bastogne and establish defensive positions just ahead of the German spearheads, which were duly repulsed by the crack "Screaming Eagles". Eventually reinforced by elements of the 9th and 10th Armored divisions and some battered survivors from the 28th Infantry Division. Although eventually encircled, the tough American airborne troopers were used to being isolated and supplied from the air and were not worried. While the German Lehr Panzer and 26th Volksgrenadier divisions formed an encircling ring around Bastogne, the 2nd and 116th Panzer Divisions skirted the defenders to penetrate further west but their supply situation would be precarious as long as the Americans could hang on to the Bastogne crossroads.

At the extreme southern end of the offensive, the German Seventh Army took some valuable ground, but the 212th and 276th Volksgrenadier divisions were largely stopped by the hard-fighting U. S. 4th Infantry Division, supported by still more elements of the ubiquitous U. S. 9th and 10th Armored divisions, spread across the whole front of the emerging "bulge". The German plan called for their Seventh Army to push further south before establishing a defense to cover the flank of their offensive, Brandenberger's army of largely under strength leg infantry units was too weak for the job and the defensive line had to be established in the positions that had been reached and were available. The German infantrymen of the Seventh Army dug-in and prepared for the inevitable American offensive from Patton's Third Army to the south.

By the evening of December 21, the original German plan for a dash north was clearly unworkable and a modified and less ambitious operation was being improvised to exploit the opportunities presented by the actual German successes. The rough terrain that had made the Ardennes such an unlikely location for a major offensive had worked against the chances of German success. Time after time, a handful of American defenders had been able to delay large German mechanized formations, usually restricted to movement on the icy and undeveloped road net. On the plus side for the Germans, so far the weather had prevented the overwhelming Allied airpower from playing much of a part in the fierce fighting. On the other hand, the often larger and heavier German tanks with their longer-range guns lost many of their advantages in terrain where lines of sight of more than a few hundred yards were rare and where mines and ambushes could be effectively concentrated along the predictably few feasible lines of advance.

Allied reinforcements were arriving in the area much faster than the German planners had anticipated. Fuhrer Hitler, who habitually and continually interfered with even the smallest details of German military operations, couldn't imagine that his political opposite numbers, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill wouldn't do the same. Reasoning that General Eisenhower would have to coordinate his actions with these two distant politicians before shifting troops to the area, Hitler was surprised by the rapid Allied response. In the event, "Ike" was in complete control of the battle, even to making a very controversial decision regarding command arrangements. The deep German penetrations were disrupting communications with Omar Bradley's U. S. Twelfth Army Group and Eisenhower made the unpopular decision to divide the "bulge" into northern and southern halves. British Field Marshal Montgomery, to the displeasure of most high-ranking American officers, was placed in charge of the northern half, taking command of Bradley's U. S. First and U. S. Ninth armies. Bradley remained in command to the south, which now included only the U. S. Third Army, which now included Troy Middleton's U. S. VIII Corps, the original defenders of the Ardennes.

The new German plan was to continue a more gradual advance on the Meuse River while massing forces to clear the bottleneck caused by the U. S. 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne. Hitler predictably called the planning changes preparation for a later continuation of the original plans but, in reality, the Germans were now reduced to causing as much damage and delay as possible to the Allied forces. Although the Germans were not yet aware of it, their opportunities to advance were coming to an end. Additional Allied forces were rapidly approaching the "bulge" to close the last gaps in the American lines. To the south, General George S. "Blood and Guts" Patton, Jr. and his U. S. Third Army were about to strike hard at the German southern flank. Soon, the advantages gained by the Germans with their initial surprise would end and the Americans on and above the battlefield would outnumber the German.

THE TIDE TURNS AND THE YANKS ATTACK

As early as December 21, German logistical difficulties became apparent when both the 2nd and 2nd SS Panzer divisions sat idle for lack of fuel. The Lehr Panzer and 26th Volksgrenadier divisions proved too weak to defeat the stubborn 101st Airborne Division, so, on December 22, German reinforcements were put in motion to move to Bastogne at the same time as Patton’s U. S. Third Army started an offensive into the German’s southern flank. The veteran 4th Armored Division spearheaded Third Army’s drive but immediately ran into fierce resistance from the 5th Fallschirmjager Division. On December 23, after Patton demanded that his chaplain compose a prayer for fair weather and, after issuing it to all Third Army units the day before, the skies cleared for the first time during the battle, and Allied aircraft swarmed over the battlefield with overwhelming power. The German Luftwaffe (Air Force) was making a maximum effort to support their offensive but their thousand aircraft were brushed aside by the qualitative and quantitative superiority of Allied air power. The clearing weather permitted air drops to supply isolated Bastogne and the unceasing Allied air support over the next four days made German daylight movements and supply efforts very difficult.

While fighting raged around Bastogne, the last German offensive moves continued to the west. The 116th Panzer Division had been repulsed at Hotton on December 21 but the 2nd SS Panzer Division continued to advance on Manhay and the 2nd Panzer Division was thrusting toward Dinant. On December 24, the 2nd Panzer Division reached Celles, which proved to be the high water mark of the German offensive. The 116th Panzer Division continued to be be repulsed by the U. S. 84th Infantry Division at Hotten and Marche and the 2nd SS Panzer and Lehr Panzer divisions subsequently had minor successes in taking Manhay and Rochefort, but the German offensive was clearly running out of steam. The powerful U. S. VII Corps under "Lightning Joe" Collins was now prepared to attack the German spearhead. The 2nd Panzer Division, sitting a Celles with no fuel, was attacked by its American opposite number, the 2nd Armored Division and largely destroyed in a series of battles. The 9th and Lehr Panzer divisions had to be sent forward to save the 2nd Panzer’s remnants and slow the 2nd Armored Division’s advance.

Meanwhile, around Bastogne, a crisis in the battle was reached. Despite supply from the air and vicious fighter-bomber attacks on the encircling Germans, General Anthony McAuliffe’s "Screaming Eagles" were under increasing pressure. McAuliffe, whose celebrated reply of, "Nuts!," to a German surrender demand is undoubtably the single most famous incident in the Battle of the Bulge, and his tough airborne troops successfully held on as the newly-arrived German 15th Panzergrenadier Division attacked. The U. S. 4th Armored Division’s relief force made only slow progress from Martelange and did not link up with the defenders of Bastogne until December 26. Further Third Army troops moved up to widen the life-line corridor into Bastogne while additional German reinforcements massed to try to isloate the town again, leading to some of the hardest and most-sustained fighting of the enire campaign. Patton was forced to feed in more and more of his constantly attacking troops into the fighting in and around Bastogne. The Germans did not give up the fight for the Belgian crossroads town until after the new year started.

This marked the absolute end of the German offensive, The Battle of the Bulge officially continued until January 29, 1945, but the nature of the January fighting was just more of the stubborn German defense that continued along the entire front. In reality, by the end of 1944, the the ability of the German forces to attack was at an end. Hitler’s great gamble had failed.